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JUDICATURE
ONCE MORE UNTO
THE BREACH?
FURTHER REFORMS CONSIDERED FOR RULE 23
by Richard Marcus
EVEN HENRY V PROBABLY
COULD NOT EXHORT THE
RULE MAKERS TO ACTION,,
but reported needs of the procedural
system may do so. Surely the class-
action rule is one of the most import-
ant in the rulebook. Equally surely, it
has vocal supporters and opponents.
Indeed, it has even attracted inter-
national detractors., Changing the
rule therefore is a project that must
be approached carefully and deliber-
ately. Only after much thought should
change proceed. Only after further
evaluation, and public comment,
should a change be adopted. But
failing to modify the rule to adapt to
evolving litigation conditions might
produce greater problems than under-
taking change.
The Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules has formed a subcommittee to
consider whether constructive changes
can be made to Rule 23, and this arti-
cle is designed to introduce the current
discussions and invite readers to make
suggestions about them. This project
is in its formative stages, and it seems
singularly appropriate for this journal
to include a report about the current
orientation. The subcommittee has
already identified issues that seem to
warrant attention, as explained below.
During 2015, work will move forward,
but the earliest that draft amendments
could be published for comment would
be the summer of 2016. This article
serves as something of an invitation for
reactions to the issues described below
and also to suggest additional issues
that may warrant attention. Because
the work is moving forward, the earlier
comments are received the more help-
ful they likely will be.
It should be clear from the outset,
however, that there is no assurance
that any change will actually be
formally proposed. And as the history
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of past amendment proposals shows,
a formal proposal by no means leads
automatically to an actual amend-
ment. So it makes sense to begin
with the rulemaking background and
then introduce the ideas now under
consideration.
THE PRE-MODERN CLASS
ACTION
The 1966 amendment of Rule 23
was the great watershed between the
modern rule and the "pre-modern"
class action. As Professor Stephen
Yeazell has demonstrated,4 the modern
class action is a lineal descendent of the
medieval group litigation in England.
In England, that sort of litigation
was often an in-court expression of
an existing social reality. Thus, the
citizens of the Village of X might seek
relief collectively against the lord. In
somewhat the same vein, the American
Supreme Court in 1853 recognized a
class action on behalf of some 1500
travelling preachers of the southern
branch of the Methodist Episcopal
Church against 3800 travelling
preachers of the northern branch of
the church in a dispute over church
property resulting from disputes about
slavery.
Although there was an Equity Rule
that dealt with class actions, there
were not many cases. Nonetheless,
Rule 23 was included in the original
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to
carry forward the old equity practice.6
Original Rule 23 did so by embracing
"jural relationships" to distinguish
among three types of class actions
the "true" class action, involving a
"joint" or "common" right, as in the
case involving the Methodist Episcopal
preachers, a "hybrid" class action,
where the rights were "several" rather
than "joint," but the action sought an
adjudication regarding specific prop-
erty. Finally, there was a "spurious"
class action, involving a right that was
"several" but presenting a common
question and seeking common relief.
In such instances, class members could
i' As Professor Miller (soon
to become Reporter to
the Advisory Committee)
explained in 1979, some
classes were certifiec
on the basis of "rather
conclusory assertions of
compliance with Rule
23(a) and (b)," and 'the
procedure fell victim to
overuse by its champions
and misuse Ioy some who
sought to exploit it for
reasons external to the
merits of the case."
elect to join the case, but unless they
did the decree would not bind them.
Many were unhappy with the oper-
ation of original Rule 23. Professor
Zechariah Chaffee, for example,
criticized it in 1950 on the ground
that he had as much trouble telling a
"common" from a "several" right as
telling whether some ties are green or
blue. On balance, he concluded, "the
situation is so tangled and bewildering
that I sometimes wonder whether the
world would be any the worse off if the
class-suit device had been left buried
in the learned obscurity of Calvert on
Parties to Suits in Equity."'
THE 1966 MAKEOVER AND ITS
EFFECTS
Unhappiness with the original version
of Rule 23 contributed to the deci-
sion to develop a revised rule in the
1960s. That effort produced the 1966
amendments, which abandoned the
focus of the original rule on the sorts
of legal categories that frustrated
Professor Chaffee and emphasized a
more functional attitude., Although
there was some controversy within
the Advisory Committee about the
proposed changes, it is not clear now
whether the drafters foresaw - or
could have foreseen - the variety of
ways in which the rule would be used
in subsequent decades., As Professor
Arthur Miller, who was present during
the deliberations leading up to the
1966 amendments, explained:
The Committee obviously could not
predict the great growth in complicated
federal and state substantive law that
would take place in such fields as race,
gender, disability, and age discrimina-
tion; consumer protection; fraud; prod-
ucts liability; environmental protection;
and pension litigation, let alone the
exponential increase in class actions and
multiparty/multi-claim practice that
would flow from the expansion of those
legal subjects."
But it does seem that the drafters
soon realized that new Rule 23 could
have major importance, and that
changing it could raise major issues. So
they resolved to refrain from consid-
ering further changes for a quarter
century thereafter."
Almost immediately, the rule was
embraced by some and used in a signif-
icant number of cases. As Professor
Miller (soon to become Reporter to
the Advisory Committee) explained
in 1979, some classes were certified
on the basis of "rather conclusory
assertions of compliance with Rule
23(a) and (b)," and "the procedure fell
victim to overuse by its champions and
misuse by some who sought to exploit
it for reasons external to the merits of
the case."" Decisions curtailing use
of class actions followed. By the late
1980s, some were predicting that the
class action would soon pass from the
scene.,, But at the same time, concern
with mass torts prompted some to try
to adapt class actions so they could
provide solutions to those problems.
If it had a near-death experience
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in the late 1980s, the class action
surely returned in the 1990s, and the
rulemakers focused on it again.
THE 1996 AMENDMENT
PACKAGE
In March 1991, the Judicial
Conference approved a recommen-
dation of its Ad Hoc Committee on
Asbestos Litigation and requested
that the Advisory Committee study
whether changes to Rule 23 should
be made to accommodate the needs
of mass tort litigation.14 Beginning in
1991, the Advisory Committee ended
its quarter-century abstinence and
resumed consideration of Rule 23. At
first, there was some consideration of a
comprehensive rethinking of the rule
like the one done in 1966.
But the actual proposals that
emerged were less aggressive. After five
years of work, the Advisory Committee
produced a preliminary draft of
proposed amendments to the rule.',
Rather than fundamentally rework the
1966 format, the package included
several recommended revisions of that
format:
(1) Revising the list of criteria for
certifying a class under Rule 23(b)(3) to
include, among others, the "maturity"
of related litigation and consideration
"whether the probable relief to individ-
ual class members justifies the costs and
burdens of class litigation."'
(2) Adding a new Rule 23(b)(4),
which would permit the parties to
submit a proposed settlement of a
Rule 23(b)(3) class action to the court
for approval and permit the court to
approve it as a binding class-action
settlement even though the require-
ments of Rule 23(b)(3) might not be
met for purposes of trial." This proposal
was prompted in part by rulings of the
Third Circuit that class actions could
not be certified for settlement unless
they could also be certified for trial.
(3) Modifying the timing requirement
for certification decisions under Rule
23(c) so that it directed that the deci-
sion be made "when practicable" rather
than "as soon as practicable."18
(4) Modifying the settlement approval
provisions of Rule 23(e) to require the
court to hold a hearing on whether to
approve a proposed class settlement.' 9
(5) Adding Rule 23(f), permitting
immediate appellate review of a deci-
sion whether to certify a class, at the
discretion of the court of appeals.21
There was a great deal of public
comment on these proposals. Much of
it was critical. Eventually Judge Paul
Niemeyer, then Chair of the Advisory
Committee, had the commentary
bound as a four-volume set of records
on this rule-amendment episode.
Meanwhile, other events moved
forward. In particular, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in Amchem
Products, Inc. v. Windsor" and decided
the case, approving some differences in
certification standards for settlement
and litigation classes. After reviewing
the public commentary and consider-
ing the possible impact of the Amchem
decision, the Advisory Committee
decided to recommend adoption only
of the addition of new Rule 23(f),
and that new rule provision went into
effect on Dec. 1, 1998. This history
may be cloudy or unknown to many
who are concerned about the contem-
porary operation of class actions, but
it is relevant to the question whether
further changes to the rule should be
pursued now.
THE 2003 AMENDMENTS
Beginning in 2000, the Advisory
Committee turned its attention to a
somewhat different sort of Rule 23
amendments from the ones included
in the 1996 package - procedural
revision of the certification and settle-
ment-approval process rather than
substantive revision of the certification
criteria.22 As in the 1991-96 period,
this consideration of options included
review of an extensive array of possibil-
ities and gradual winnowing of the list
of possible amendment ideas.
Unlike the 1996-98 experience, in
this amendment package most of the
proposed changes went forward and
became effective in 2003.21 Because
these rule changes were adopted, they
are likely more familiar to contempo-
rary readers than the proposals that
were not adopted, so a brief recounting
should suffice:
(1) Timing and Content of Certification
Decision: Rule 23(c) was amended to
direct that the certification decision be
made "[alt an early practicable time,"
and that the certification order define
the class, and the class claims and
defenses. It also was amended to direct
that the notice of certification to Rule
23(b)(3) classes "clearly and concisely
state, in plain, easily understood
language" at least seven specific things
that had not all been spelled out in the
prior rule.
(2) Settlement Approval Criteria and
Procedures: Until 2003, Rule 23(e) was
almost entirely devoid of specifics on
how a court was to decide whether to
approve a proposed class-action settle-
ment. Amended Rule 23(e) contains
a standard for judicial approval -
that the proposed settlement is "fair,
reasonable, and adequate." It also adds
a number of specifics - that the parties
must identify any "side agreements"
made in connection with the proposed
settlement, that any class member may
object, but may withdraw an objection
only with the court's approval, and
that the court may refuse to approve
the settlement unless a second opt-out
is permitted in a Rule 23(b)(3) class
action if the original time to opt out has
expired.
(3) Class Counsel: It had long been
recognized that class counsel play
an extremely prominent role in the
conduct and success of class actions.
But there were no provisions in the
rule explicitly about counsel, although
courts had considered their capacity
under the Rule 23(a)(4) adequacy
prong. In 2003, Rule 23(g) was added,
providing a standard for appointment,
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requiring consideration of four matters
and authorizing consideration of any
other pertinent matters, and permitting
appointment of interim class counsel
before class certification. The rule also
articulates the duty of class counsel to
"fairly and adequately represent the
interests of the class."
(4) Attorney's Fees: By 2003, it had also
long been recognized that attorney's fee
awards played an important role in the
functioning and fairness of class actions
in general and class-action settlements
in particular. But as with class coun-
sel, there had been no rule provision
addressed to this important issue. Rule
23(h) was added in 2003 to guide
these decisions. Among other things,
it requires that class members be given
notice of the motion for attorney's
fees, provides that a class member may
object, and directs that the court must
hold a hearing and make findings of fact
and state conclusions of law in connec-
tion with its resolution of fee award
matters.
In sum, 2003 could be viewed as
a "procedural" watershed for Rule 23
in that an array of specifics about how
class-action matters should be handled
were added to the rule. Often the
rule provisions built on prior judicial
experience with class actions. Certainly
the amendments were not designed
primarily to change judicial practice.
TOPICS CURRENTLY UNDER
CONSIDERATION
Many possible subjects for Rule 23
amendments have been examined over
the years, but few rule changes have
actually been adopted. Concerns about
the use of class actions, and the smooth
functioning of these cases, continue.
Moreover, the law keeps evolving. The
Supreme Court has decided a remark-
able number of class-action cases in
recent years.24 In 2005, Congress passed
the Class Action Fairness Act. In the
wake of these developments, some
believe class actions are in decline,25
but others seem to see them as a
4 Moreover, the law keeps
evolving. The Supreme
Court has decided a
remarkable number of
class-action cases in
recent years. In 2005,
Congress passed the
Class Action Fairness
Act. In the wake of these
developments, some
believe class actions are in
decline, but others seem
to see them as a threat to
the economy.
threat to the economy. In some quar-
ters, concerns about predatory class
settlement objectors have emerged.2
Meanwhile, more than a decade has
passed since the 2003 amendments to
Rule 23 went into effect.
Altogether, these developments
and others - suggested that it
would make sense for the Advisory
Committee to return its attention
to Rule 23. In 2011, the Advisory
Committee appointed a Rule 23
Subcommittee. In 2011-12, it made
a preliminary survey of possible issues
for rule reform. Beginning in early
2014, the Subcommittee returned to
its list and reconsidered the importance
of the items originally identified.
2
7
The experience of the last two
decades shows that reforming Rule 23
is a challenging and time-consuming
process. The process of winnowing
(and expanding) the list of topics to
address as possible candidates for rule
changes is ongoing and almost certain
to evolve. But enough winnowing has
already occurred to make it useful to
identify the candidates that presently
seem to be "front-burner" subjects:
(1) Rqc h ily Sett/e;ze 2t R Uezt Crite;ia:
Only since 2003 has the rule contained
any specifics about how judges should
evaluate proposed class settlements.
Now it says that the courts should
focus on whether a proposed settlement
is "fair, reasonable, and adequate. '"21
That set of criteria was largely based on
existing case law.
In the view of some, that exist-
ing case law has shortcomings. For
example, the American Law Institute
Principles of Aggregate Litigation
report:
The current case law on the criteria
for evaluating settlements is in disar-
ray. Courts articulate a wide range of
factors to consider, but rarely discuss
the significance to be given to each
factor, let alone why a particular factor
is probative....
Many of these criteria may have
questionable probative value in various
circumstances. For instance, although a
court might give weight to the fact that
counsel for the class or the defendant
favors the settlement, the court should
keep in mind that the lawyers who
negotiated the settlement will rarely
offer anything less than a strong favor-
able endorsement.
29
To remedy this problem, the ALI
Principles propose that a court approv-
ing a proposed settlement must make
findings on several "mandatory" topics:
(1) the class representatives and class
counsel have been and currently are
adequately representing the class;
(2) the relief afforded to the class
(taking into account any ancillary agree-
ment that may be part of the settle-
ment) is fair and reasonable given the
costs, risks, probability of success, and
delays of trial and appeal;
(3) class members are treated equi-
tably (relative to each other) based on
their facts and circumstances and are
not disadvantaged by the settlement
considered as a whole; and
(4) the settlement was negotiated at
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arm's length and was not the product of
collusion. 3
°
These Principles do not make
any other consideration irrelevant to
settlement approval, but do direct that
a court may not approve a settlement
unless it can make the findings listed
above."
As it moves forward, the Advisory
Committee will need to consider
whether more precise criteria would
improve the handling of settlement
review - either by ensuring that
certain essential matters are always
addressed or assuring that other inap-
propriate matters are not emphasized.
It will also need to consider whether
there is a genuine need for a rule
that attempts to do these things, and
whether adopting such a rule could
produce negative consequences.
(2) Settlevient Class Certijwfalion:
In 1996, a preliminary draft of a
new Rule 23(b)(4) was published to
enable certification only for settlement
purposes of a Rule 23(b)(3) class action
that could not meet the requirements
for litigation certification. Some argue
that the certification requirements for
litigation should not be relaxed at all
for settlement certification.31 Clearly
the Supreme Court's Amchem decision
says that there are differences between
certifying a settlement and a litigation
class. But the Court's opinion also
said that the Rule 23(b)(3) predomi-
nance requirement should apply in the
settlement-review setting. In partial
dissent, Justice Stephen Breyer said he
was bewildered by how the predom-
inance prong of the rule should work
when settlement was proposed, given
that the issues before the court were
fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy.13
Since 1997, an abiding question
has existed about whether the Amchem
standards for settlement certification
unduly cramped settlement opportu-
nities. Some see the increased resort to
MDL processes as proving that settling
class actions has become too difficult. 34
If that is a troubling trend, is it time
Rueom()pron s fo u le-
cuentlyiict rune povsier-
athen for Priesfo incluegat
0 ettlement
trevi oethn rie te 99
Rul 23bS )pooa o ettlemncls
certification depend on satisfying the
standards for approval of the proposed
settlement and that (1) "significant"
common issues exist; (2) the class
is sufficiently numerous to warrant
classwide treatment; and (3) the class
definition is sufficient to ascertain who
is included in the class. The drafters
explain this proposal:
For many years, courts and commen-
taAts have debated whether the
strict requirements for certifying a
class action for litigation purposes
should apply in the context of a case
in which certification is sought solely
for purposes of achieving a classwide
settlement .... Some states ... have
adopted rules that exempt settlement
classes from the stringent requirements
for certifying a litigation class. This
Section does not require a settlement
class to satisfy all of the same criteria as
a class certified for purposes of litiga-
tion. For example, settlement classes
should not be subject to a rigorous
evidentiary showing that, in a contested
trial, common issues would outweigh
individualized issues. So long as there is
sufficient commonality to establish the
case is generally cohesive, the propri-
ety of a settlement need not depend
on satisfaction of a "predominance"
requirement. 6
Is this proposal a promising
response to a real problem? It does
seem contrary to the language in the
Amchem opinion about the role of the
predominance factor in the settlement
context, at least in a Rule 23(b)(3) class
action. Its emphasis on the importance
of finding the settlement proposal
satisfactory appears at a tension with
the Amchem Court's view that Rule
23(e) review is no substitute for scru-
tiny under Rule 23(a) and (b).11 Would
that be an appropriate change in the
rule? Or would it be too broad an
invitation to courts to implement what
the Amchem Court called "a grand-scale
compensation scheme," which it said
was "a matter for legislative consider-
ation.",, Would it be preferable instead
to weaken or remove predominance
from the Rule 23(b)(3) calculus rather
than superseding more of Rules 23(a)
and (b) in instances in which the court
is satisfied with the proposed settle-
ment under the standards of Rule
23(e)?
The 1996 Rule 23(b)(4) proposal
was limited to settlement certification
under Rule 23(b)(3). If more aggres-
sive action is warranted to facilitate
settlement certification in those cases,
should it be extended to classes certi-
fied under Rules 23(b)(1) and (2)? As
to "mandatory" class certification such
as that authorized in "limited fund"
situations covered by Rule 23(b)(1)(B),
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it may be argued that predominance
of common questions has no role to
play in deciding whether class-action
treatment is warranted, and that this
treatment is not suitable for purposes
of settlement in situations in which
it would not be justified for purposes
of full litigation.3 But it may be
that Rule 23(b)(2) class actions for
injunctive relief are peculiarly suited
to settlement class certification, as
an injunction limited to some in the
class seems inherently inadequate, and
Rule 23(b)(1)(A) class certification
may raise similar issues. So a related
issue is whether, should some provision
for settlement class certification go
forward, it should include cases relying
on Rule 23(b)(1) or (2).
(3) Cy Pres Provisios: Cy pres
provisions in class-action settlements
have provoked much interest and also
produced some uneasiness among
judges. Chief Justice John Roberts
recently observed, while concurring in
denial of certiorari in the case before the
Court, that the Supreme Court "may
need to clarify the limits on the use of
such remedies."" Perhaps a clarifying
rule provision would be an alternative
route for dealing with the topic.
The drafters of the ALI Principles
of Aggregate Litigation included a
section about cy pres treatment among
their proposals. 4 ' The proposal seeks
to limit use of this technique, and
would direct that if class members can
be identified with reasonable effort
and the amount of money is sufficient
to make individual distributions to
them economically viable, distribu-
tions must be made to them, not to
others.41 Recognizing that after such
distributions there is often a residue of
settlement funds, the proposal further
directs that this residue must be also
distributed to class members unless
the amounts involved would be too
small to make individual distributions
economically viable.43 Only when indi-
vidual distributions to class members
are not economically viable may the
court authorize distributions to others.
' Chief Justice
Roberts recently
observed, while
concurring in
denial of
certiorari in the
case before the
Court, that the
Supreme Court
"may need to
clarify the limits
on the use of
such [cy pres]
remedies."
The "premise" of the ALI proposal
is that the settlement funds are
"presumptively the property of the
class members."" So distributing
the money to others should only be
considered when delivering the money
to the class is not economically viable.
Returning the residue to the defendant
(a "reversion") is viewed as unwise
because it "would undermine the
deterrence function of class actions and
the underlying substantive-law basis of
the recovery by rewarding the alleged
wrongdoer simply because distribution
to the class would not be viable.",
This ALI proposal has been adopted
by some courts." But the rule currently
says nothing about cy pres arrange-
ments. Should it be revised to address
that possibility? If so, should that be
limited to settlement class actions? For
some time, a related notion of "fluid
recovery" was urged in some cases 41
and it may be that such a provision
could be adopted in a litigated class
action in which some class members
could not be identified.
Many questions might arise were
such a rule provision under consider-
ation. Should the availability of such
measures depend on a legal basis from
outside the rules? The law of some
states may explicitly authorize cy pres
measures. If distribution of a residue
to someone other than class members
is contemplated, should the class be
entitled to notice of this possibility?
To whom should the court be autho-
rized to distribute the funds? Often
the proposal is that the money be paid
to individuals or organizations that
further the interests asserted in the
underlying suit. But in some instances
it might be argued that remaining
funds could appropriately be deliv-
ered to "public interest" organizations
whatever their particular foCUS.4
Would that be a desirable feature of a
rule provision?
(4) The Role of OWiectos: Class
members are entitled to notice of a
proposed settlement 5° and to object
to the proposal.' If they object, "the
objection may be withdrawn only
with the court's approval."52 At least
on occasion, there seem to be concerns
that objectors seek to extract tribute
by delaying consummation of the
proposed settlement rather than raising
genuine objections to the settlement
proposal.,, How often this behavior
occurs is uncertain. But there certainly
are examples of objectors who make
genuine objections to the merits of
proposed settlements rather than seek-
ing to profit from obstruction.
One goal of the provision requiring
court approval for withdrawing an
objection was to enable the court to
exercise some control over the behavior
of objectors. It is uncertain whether
that provision achieved its objective.
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In part, it may be that some objectors
escape it by noticing an appeal when
the court approves the settlement
despite their objections, and then
withdrawing their appeal for a payoff.
Given the amount of time it takes to
dispose of an appeal - compared to
the time needed to review and approve
a proposed settlement - it may be
that this tactic is effective.
Some have urged that district courts
counter this sort of behavior by impos-
ing a bond requirement on objectors
who appeal. But it seems difficult to
support such measures under current
law, which permits only limited
recovery of costs on appeal.' It may be
that rule revisions to the Appellate and
Civil Rules might create a requirement
of court approval for withdrawing an
appeal once filed (analogous to the
existing requirement of approval to
withdraw an objection in the district
court), but it may be that such a provi-
sion should enable the district judge
(more familiar with the case) to pass
on the request to withdraw the appeal,
as the district judge can already pass
on the request to withdraw an objec-
tion. It might also be that requiring
some disclosure of "side agreements"
in connection with withdrawal of an
objection or appeal comparable to that
required of the settling parties" would
be desirable. But such provisions
might themselves introduce further
delays in situations in which delay
should be avoided, and might also call
for delicate treatment of the respective
roles of district judges and courts of
appeals.
So there remain questions about
whether problems caused by objec-
tors justify addressing such compli-
cations, and how rule changes could
best address these problems if they are
serious enough.
(5) Miootnes and Rle 68 O/ec of
j//(4niieent: It has long been true that
a defendant could attempt to moot
a proposed class action by offering
the named plaintiff an amount that
exceeded his or her individual prospec-
tive recovery.16 Until 2003, Rule
23(e) was interpreted to require court
approval for a dismissal of any action
filed as a class action. As amended in
2003, however, the rule now requires
court approval only for the settlement
of a "certified class.",, Although a
proposal for a classwide settlement
would therefore require court approval,
a proposal for an "individual" settle-
ment would not. And in 2013 the
Supreme Court held (by a 5-4 margin)
that a Rule 68 offer could moot a
proposed collective action under the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),
although it said that class actions are
different."
For defendants facing claimants with
small individual claims that they assert
on behalf of potentially large putative
classes, making a Rule 68 offer to moot
the case may be an inviting method to
pick off a putative class action before
it becomes a full-fledged class action.
In the Seventh Circuit, it seems that
class-action plaintiffs who seek to
forestall that sort of thing must file
"out-of-the-chute" class-certification
motions. 6 But judges in other circuits
have not welcomed such "out-of-the-
chute" class -certification motions.
Consider the views of a district judge in
Alabama asked to defer ruling on such
a premature certification motion:
tThis might be compelling if this
Court were situated in the Seventh
Circuit, if the law of the Seventh Circuit
governed this proceeding, or if the
Seventh Circuit approach constituted
either a majority rule or one as to which
the Eleventh Circuit had expressed favor.
This is not the case. In fact, the Seventh
Circuit acknowledged the uniqueness of
its formulation of the mooness rule in
pick-off situations ... 61
Whether these issues are serious
enough to justify a rule amendment
is not certain. At least some courts of
appeals seem unreceptive to arguments
based on the Supreme Court's FLSA
decision.12 If rule amendments are
worth considering to address the "pick-
off' problem, it might be debated
what they should be. One possibility
would be to restore to Rule 23(e) the
requirement previously recognized that
even individual settlements require
court approval. Another might be to
change Rule 68 to make it inappli-
cable to class actions (and derivative
actions) since the court-approval
requirement would prevent using the
rule to settle with the class. But Rule
68 does not itself speak to mooness;
indeed, it precludes filing the offer in
court unless it is accepted and then
directs immediate entry of judgment,
something ill-suited to the class-action
settlement setting. It may be that these
problems will cure themselves in the
relatively near future.
(6) Issnes Classes: Rule 23(c)(4) says
that "[wihen appropriate, an action
may be brought or maintained as a
class action with respect to partic-
ular issues." Rule 23(b)(3), on the
other hand, says that a class action
may be certified only when common
issues predominate. For some time, it
appeared that a conflict existed among
the courts of appeals on whether Rule
23(b)(3) classes could be certified
under Rule 23(c)(4) without satisfying
the predominance requirement. The
Fifth Circuit declared in a footnote in
its Castano decision: "A district court
cannot manufacture predominance
through the nimble use of subdivision
(c)(4 )."13 The Second Circuit declared
in 2006 that it disagreed, and that (c)
(4) may be used to certify a class as to
some but not all issues.64 More recently,
some commentators have argued that
actually the Fifth Circuit has embraced
issue classes. 6'
Whether this is an occasion for
seriously considering a rule change is
uncertain. On the one hand, one might
say there is almost an inherent tension
between Rule 23(b)(3) and (c)( 4 ).
On the other hand, if the courts have
reached agreement on how to imple-
ment these rule provisions as currently
written, it would seem a rule change
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SiThe question whether
there are promising
avenues for rule
amendments - either
along the lines sketched
above or otherwise -
remains very much open.
would be worth considering only to
change that treatment. A rule change
could attempt to clarify either: (a)
that (c)(4 ) may only be used for a class
action that already satisfies Rules 23(a)
and (b); or (b) that despite the predom-
inance requirement of (b)(3) a class
could be certified under (c)(4) "when
appropriate." In either event, one
might favor addressing something that
may be uncertain under the current
rule - what does the court do after
resolving the issue for which the class
was certified? It is unclear what sort of
judgment would then be appropriate,
but not obvious how the court would
be expected to resolve all other issues
involving individual class members so
that a full judgment could be entered.
The ALI Aggregate Litigation
Principles generally favor discretion
to employ issue classes, 6 but add that
interlocutory appeals should be autho-
rized for the district court's decision of
those common issues." Current Rule
23 does not have such a provision.
So another possibility - if the rule
should be amended to facilitate the
use of issues classes, and possibly even
if current practice adequately fosters
use of (c)(4 ) certification - might be a
rule amendment to provide for imme-
diate appellate review. But an abiding
question is whether any amendments
should be seriously considered to deal
with issues classes.
(7) Notice to Claus Aembers: The
Supreme Court's 1974 Eisen decision"
declared that the rule requires notice
by first class mail to all Rule 23(b)
(3) class members who can be identi-
fied with reasonable effort. Except in
the settlement context, however, the
rule calls for no notice at all to class
members in Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2)
classes. In 2001, a proposal to require
some efforts to give notice of class
certification in (b)(1) and (b)(2) class
actions was published for comment.
It was not included in the eventual
amendment package, however. During
the public comment period, opposi-
tion was expressed on the ground that
the cost of giving notice would deter
lawyers from taking public interest
cases.
Viewed from the 2 1st century
perspective, a legal requirement for
"snail mail" notice seems antique.
Certainly most Americans rely heav-
ily on other means of communication
that are faster and cheaper. Indeed, it
may be that the concerns expressed in
2001 about the cost of notice in (b)
(1) and (b)(2) cases might no longer be
troubling. The notion that first-class
mail must still be used surely does
look troubling, if it is still seriously
embraced.
So the questions include: (a)
whether the rule should be changed on
manner of giving notice; (b) whether
notice requirements should be broad-
ened to include all class actions; and
(c) what substitute methods of notice
should be accepted or adopted. In
addition, such issues might include
consideration of online methods
for class members to use to submit
claims, either to a settlement fund or
in connection with an adjudication of
liability (perhaps in an issues class).
CONCLUSION
Nearly 40 years ago, Professor Abram
Chayes observed: "I think it unlikely
that the class action will ever be
taught to behave in accordance with
the precepts of the traditional model
of litigation. '"6) It may be that the
Advisory Committee's subsequent
experience with Rule 23 somewhat
confirms that prediction. But that does
not mean that rule changes should or
will emerge to address the issues listed
above. In addressing that question,
the Advisory Committee continues
to seek guidance, and that guidance
could include identifying other issues
that might profitably be addressed by
changing the rule. Although Henry V
was exhorting his troops to do battle,"
the Advisory Committee is only inter-
ested in making improvements in the
rules that will produce improvements
in practice. The question whether
there are promising avenues for rule
amendments - either along the
lines sketched above or otherwise -
remains very much open.
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